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Balancing Individual and Societal Interests
Under the First Amendment: How the
Eighth Circuit Saved Fantasy Baseball
Salvatore Vetrini*
“There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity
and the right of freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.”1
The recent Eighth Circuit decision in C.B.C. Distribution
and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P.2 thoroughly exemplifies this tension.  Broadly speaking,
the court’s majority balanced the individual interest of a holder
of publicity rights against the societal interest of the public in
the free expression and flow of ideas.  The United States Su-
preme Court has applied this type of individual-societal reason-
ing in other kinds of First Amendment cases.3  This Note argues
that while C.B.C. Distribution’s traditional balancing of individ-
ual interests against societal interests does not overwhelmingly
favor the latter in light of Supreme Court precedent, other fac-
tors tip the scale and lead the court to the right outcome.  The
ultimate result is the defanging of the right of publicity—ren-
dering the right an ineffective means to redress the alleged
harm caused by the unlicensed use of professional sports player
information and statistics—and the maintenance of a widely
popular vehicle baseball fans use to connect to the game.
* Pace University School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2009.  I would like to thank
Professor Bennett Gershman for his inspiration and help in organizing this article.
I would also like to thank the PACE LAW REVIEW staff for its masterful editing and
advice.
1. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2872 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (employment speech
context); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (right of privacy context);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation context); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (press publication context). See infra Part V.
199
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I. Summary of the Case
In C.B.C. Distribution, the plaintiff, C.B.C. Distribution
and Marketing, Inc. (“CBC”), an online fantasy baseball pro-
vider and former licensee of the Major League Baseball Player’s
Association (“MLBPA”), brought suit, seeking a declaratory
judgment that it had the right to make unlicensed use of player
names and statistics.4  The defendant, Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P. (“MLBAM”), the current and exclusive li-
censee of such information, counterclaimed, asserting that CBC
violated the players’ rights of publicity under Missouri state
law.5  The licensor, MLBPA, subsequently intervened on behalf
of MLBAM, claiming that CBC breached its prior agreement
with MLBPA.6  In 2002, CBC and MLBPA entered into an
agreement providing the former with a license to use player
“ ‘names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing
records, and/or biographical data . . . .’ ”7  This agreement, how-
ever, expired in 2005 and contained no-use and no-contest pro-
visions—provisions that MLBPA claimed were breached by
CBC in their unlicensed use of player names and statistics.8  In
2005, MLBPA and MLBAM entered into an agreement giving
MLBAM the “exclusive right to use baseball players’ names and
performance information,” the same information CBC was enti-
tled to under the since-expired 2002 agreement.9
The district court found that CBC did not violate the play-
ers’ publicity rights and excused CBC’s violations of the no-use
4. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 820.  A declaratory judgment is a “binding
adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal relations of the parties
without providing for or ordering enforcement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (8th
ed. 2004).  Here, CBC asked the district court for a binding adjudication securing
CBC’s right to use player names and performance statistics without a license.
C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 820.
5. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 82.  MLBAM was started by a “group of
Major League Baseball [team] owners to manage the expansion of the sport onto
the Internet and other new technologies. . . . [MLBAM] acquired the rights to
player identities for use in fantasy sports from the [MLBPA] . . . .”  Gabriel Gross-
man, Comment, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB. Advanced Media Redefined
the Right of Publicity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 289-90 (2007) (analyzing the
district court’s, not the Eighth Circuit’s,  decision).
6. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 820.
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and no-contest provisions on public policy grounds.10  The
Eighth Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision, albeit on different
grounds.11  Specifically, the Eighth Circuit found that although
CBC did indeed violate the players’ publicity rights under Mis-
souri law, the First Amendment overrode the violation.12
II. Overview of Fantasy Sports
In order to comprehend the necessity of player names and
performance statistics in fantasy baseball games, it is helpful to
understand the mechanics of fantasy sports.  While multiple
formats exist, the game of fantasy baseball generally allows
participants to create fantasy “teams” by “drafting” real profes-
sional baseball players at the start of the season.13  These teams
are pitted against the other teams in one’s “league” and accu-
mulate points based on the real-life statistics accrued by each
player.14  Essentially, a fantasy team “owner” selects players
and receives points based on the individual daily performances
of each player he or she drafts.  Fantasy sports providers like
CBC provide mechanisms to coordinate these drafts and track
scoring as the season progresses.  Herein lies a fantasy sports
provider’s (and CBC’s) absolute dependence on player names
and performance statistics.  Without the use of names, it would
be difficult to select and track players during the season.  With-
out the use of statistics, it would be impossible to score each
fantasy team.
This case was closely watched by fantasy sports providers,
professional sports leagues, and fantasy sports consumers.  In
fact, the NFL Players Association, NBA Properties, NHL Enter-
prises, the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing
(NASCAR), the PGA Tour, and WNBA Enterprises filed an
amici curiae brief in favor of the defendants, MLBAM and the
10. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
11. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 825.
12. Id. at 824.  The Eighth Circuit also excused CBC’s breach of the no-use
and no-contest provisions on different grounds, finding that the MLBPA breached
a warranty in the 2002 agreement between itself and CBC. Id. at 825.  Essen-
tially, the MLBPA’s prior breach excused CBC’s breach.  Id.
13. See Grossman, supra note 5, at 286-87.
14. Id. at 287.
3
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MLBPA (collectively “MLB”).15  In sum, MLB and the amici pro-
fessional sports leagues wanted the exclusive right to offer fan-
tasy sports to the public by securing the exclusive right to use
player names and statistics, which is, as noted above, informa-
tion vital to the operation of fantasy sports.  Or, as the amici
sports leagues put it themselves:
To capitalize and expand upon this core business, each
Amicus has developed an extensive program for licens-
ing its intellectual property in association with a large
array of goods and services, including fantasy sports
games . . . on-line information, [and] interactive
games. . . . The commercial exploitation of Amici’s in-
tellectual property is an exceptionally important
means of building brand awareness and creating reve-
nue for each Amicus and its respective sports organi-
zation. Officially licensed sports-themed products and
services, including those products and services li-
censed by Amici, generate billions of dollars in retail
sales each year.16
Consequently, if MLB succeeded in its lawsuit, the amici
sports leagues would presumably seek similar judgments
against other unlicensed, “rogue” fantasy sports providers like
CBC, thereby allowing the leagues to monopolize the lucrative
fantasy sports market by restricting the use of their players’
names and statistics to those providers willing to pay large li-
censing fees.  For example, MLBAM paid $50 million for a five-
year license.17  According to the Fantasy Sports Trade Associa-
tion, the fantasy sports industry’s value is approximately $1 bil-
15. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 818.
16. Brief for NBA Properties, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defend-
ants-Appellants, C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-3357, 06-3358), 2006 WL
4003425 (emphasis added).
17. See Grossman, supra note 5, at 290.  Without delving into the mechanics
of antitrust law, “monopolize” is not used in a wholly colloquial sense here.  Com-
mentators have suggested that publicity rights, like those invoked by MLB players
in C.B.C. Distribution, can be viewed as fungible assets. See Melissa B. Jacoby &
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted
Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1323 (2002) (analyz-
ing publicity rights as property in the debtor-creditor context where rights may be
utilized to pay unsatisfied debts); Raymond J. Dowd, Rights of Publicity: Elvis,
Marilyn, and the Federal Courts, 54 FED. L. 12 (2007) (characterizing publicity
rights as property rights that are pecuniary in nature). See also Hastings H.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
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lion and has around twenty million consumers in the United
States and Canada.18  Yahoo! Sports, the single largest fantasy
sports provider, has over four million customers alone.19  If the
Eighth Circuit had ruled in favor of MLB, similar litigation,
perhaps this time initiated by other sports leagues, would have
certainly followed.  Such litigation would have been the natural
result of the sports leagues’ explicit strategy of capitalizing
upon its core business of intellectual property licensing.
III. The Right of Publicity
In C.B.C. Distribution, the majority and the dissent agreed
that state publicity right claims must be balanced against First
Amendment considerations, and that the First Amendment
trumped CBC’s violation of the players’ publicity rights.20  For
the right of publicity, Missouri state law required MLB to prove
that its players’ names were used as a symbol of their identities,
without their consent, and with the intent to obtain some com-
mercial advantage.21  More generally, the right of publicity has
been defined as the privilege “to control the commercial value
and exploitation of [one’s] name or picture or likeness, or to pre-
vent others from unfairly appropriating that value for commer-
cial benefit.”22
The right of publicity, though distinct from, hatched from
the right of privacy.23  As depicted in William Prosser’s seminal
article on the subject,24 the right of privacy is generally de-
scribed as a “a complex of four torts, embracing unreasonable
intrusions upon another’s seclusion, public disclosure of private
facts, publicity placing another in a false light, and the appro-
Beard, Squeezing “The Juice”: Can the Right of Publicity Be Used to Satisfy a Civil
Judgment?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 151-57 (2007).
18. Joshua Chaffin, All to Play for in Fantasy Sports, FINANCIAL TIMES
DEUTSCHLAND, (Dec. 24, 2007), available at http://www.ftd.de/karriere_manage-
ment/business_english/:Business%20English%20All/294830.html.
19. Id.
20. See 505 F.3d at 823; see also id. at 826 (Colloton, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the majority’s analysis of Missouri’s right of publicity and its interaction with
the First Amendment).
21. Id. at 822 (majority opinion) (citing Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d
363, 369 (Mo. 2003)).
22. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 6 (2008).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
24. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
5
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priation for the defendant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.”25  The Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly codi-
fies these four torts,26 and they are currently recognized by
states across the country.27  In 1953, however, the Second Cir-
cuit established a new right distinct from the right of privacy:
“[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his pic-
ture. . . . This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”28
In that same case, the Second Circuit went on to reason
that “[t]his right . . . would usually yield [the right holders] no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant
which barred [others] from using their pictures.”29  This con-
struction derives from Prosser’s fourth tort theory noted above:
protecting against the advantageous appropriation of the right
holder’s name or likeness.30  The distinction between the two
rights lies in the right of publicity’s emphasis on the right
holder’s commercial interests and the unfair use of those inter-
ests by another.31  Abstractly, the right of privacy is more about
the “personal right to be left alone,” while the right of publicity
is about the “business right to control use of one’s identity in
commerce.”32  In looking to courts to uphold this right, publicity
right holders aim to secure the “ ‘commercial value of their
fame’” and “ ‘prevent[ ] the unjust enrichment of others seeking
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
27. Id. at cmt. c.
28. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).  Currently, many states recognize a right of publicity by statute. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1967); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 1984);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992).  In other states, like Missouri, the
right is solely a product of common law. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d
363 (Mo. 2003).  Thirty-six states recognize the right in some form; however, there
is no federal right of publicity. See Keith D. Willis, Note, Paparazzi, Tabloids, and
the New Hollywood Press: Can Celebrities Claim A Defensible Publicity Right in
Order to Prevent the Media from Following Their Every Move?, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 175, 183 (2007).
29. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
30. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Ct. App.
2001).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995).
32. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967
(10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR107.txt unknown Seq: 7 28-APR-09 8:29
2008] INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL INTERESTS 205
to appropriate’ the commercial value . . . for themselves.”33  Or,
as the Eighth Circuit phrased it in C.B.C. Distribution, the
right ensures that “an individual [can] reap the rewards of his
or her endeavors . . . .”34  In C.B.C. Distribution, the Eight Cir-
cuit went on to emphasize that protecting non-economic inter-
ests in this context is the task of the right of privacy and has no
application to the right of publicity.35  In simpler terms, the
Tenth Circuit has described the right as the “right of a person to
control the commercial use of his or her identity.”36  To summa-
rize, the individual right holder’s economic interests are para-
mount to the right of publicity.  This emphasis on solely
economic interests distinguishes the right of publicity from the
right of privacy.
There is another, more practical difference between privacy
rights and publicity rights.  Although courts have been histori-
cally reluctant to permit celebrities to rely on the right of pri-
vacy,37 courts have been more receptive to celebrity right of
publicity claims.38  Most notably, Vanna White of “Wheel of For-
tune” overcame a motion for summary judgment against elec-
tronics producer Samsung where the latter’s advertisement
contained a robot bearing White’s resemblance.39
IV. The Eighth Circuit’s First Amendment Analysis
After finding that CBC indeed violated MLB players’ rights
of publicity under Missouri law, the court relied on the Supreme
Court case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.40
for the proposition that “state law rights of publicity must be
33. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995)).
34. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
35. Id.
36. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967 (emphasis added).
37. See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 n.6
(Ct. App. 2001) (noting the “anomaly of a celebrity suing for loss of privacy”).
38. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996)
(right of publicity claim brought by NBA player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar for the un-
authorized use of his likeness in a television commercial).
39. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).
40. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
7
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balanced against the First Amendment.”41  In Zacchini, the
plaintiff, a human cannonball performer, sued a broadcasting
company that televised his entire act on its daily news show
without his permission.42  The Zacchini Court reasoned that the
right of publicity’s purpose has nothing to do with “protecting
feelings or reputation” like the right of privacy, but instead con-
cerns “protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in
his act in part to encourage such entertainment . . . [and] to
reap the reward of his endeavors.”43  Further distinguishing be-
tween privacy and publicity rights, the Zacchini Court asserted
that the dissemination of the plaintiff’s act is not by itself the
essence of the claim.  Rather, such a complaint is the concern of
privacy rights.  In Zacchini, the core question of the plaintiff’s
claim is “who gets to do the publishing” and therefore gets to
profit from publication of the act.44
Though the Zacchini Court ultimately found for the plain-
tiff, the Eighth Circuit applied the Zacchini rationale in C.B.C.
Distribution.  In C.B.C. Distribution, MLB’s real problem was
not with the mere disclosure of players’ names and statistics—
such is done daily in newspapers and other forms of media—but
was with CBC’s unlicensed use of such information and the re-
sulting profits.  To resolve this question, the Eighth Circuit bal-
anced MLB players’ individual interests associated with the
right of publicity against the public’s First Amendment inter-
ests.  Although it is perhaps simpler to view CBC’s right as a
personal or individual one afforded to it by the First Amend-
ment, federal courts’ concerns in these kinds of cases have tra-
41. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).  Interestingly, Zacchini is the only case to
date where the Supreme Court has subjected a right of publicity claim to constitu-
tional analysis. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973.  However, it should be noted that the
balancing approach to First Amendment-publicity rights issues has been criticized
on the ground that such an approach provides unacceptable levels of uncertainty.
See Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Pub-
licity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 499-500 (2003).
42. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
43. Id. at 573.  This “encouragement” or “incentive” argument has been found
to be unconvincing when put forth by celebrities and MLB players specifically be-
cause they are “already handsomely compensated.”  Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974.
44. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
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ditionally been over the larger effects that restraints on a single
person’s First Amendment rights will have on society at large.45
Before applying this balancing test, however, the C.B.C.
Distribution court addressed two preliminary issues.  First, the
court emphasized that the information at issue “is all readily
available in the public domain” and foreclosing a person’s First
Amendment right to use such information would be “strange
law.”46  Second, the court tackled the purpose of CBC’s use of
the information.  The court rejected MLB’s argument that
CBC’s use of player names and statistics did not constitute
speech at all, and instead held that it was immaterial whether
CBC’s purpose was to inform or entertain, for both purposes are
entitled to First Amendment protection.47
Beginning with the societal interest prong of the balancing
test, the Eighth Circuit noted that other courts have “recog-
nized the public value of information about the game of baseball
and its players . . . .”48  The court then remarked that “ ‘baseball
is followed by millions[,] . . . the public has an enduring fascina-
tion in [baseball’s] records,’” and there is a “ ‘substantial public
interest’” in this form of expression.49  Such societal interests,
as noted below, are unique in that they are not commonly in-
voked in cases that involve First Amendment principles.
The court then turned to the other element of the balancing
test—the players’ individual interests associated with their
publicity rights.  The court essentially found that those inter-
ests were not implicated by the facts of the case.50  First, the
rights of the players to reap the rewards of their endeavors and
to earn a living were not issues because MLB baseball players
are “rewarded, and handsomely, too” and earn additional in-
come from “endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”51
Second, there existed no possibility that fantasy baseball par-
ticipants would be misled because “fantasy baseball games de-
45. See infra Part V.
46. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 823-24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr.
2d 307, 315 (Ct. App. 2001)).
50. Id. at 824.
51. Id.  This assertion echoes that of the Cardtoons court’s repudiation of the
“incentive” argument. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
9
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pend on the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a
false impression that” the players are in fact endorsing CBC’s
products—online fantasy baseball games.52  Third, the court
dismissed a set of non-economic interests some have associated
with the right of publicity, such as “rewarding celebrity labors,
and avoiding emotional harm,” because such interests are the
domain of the right of privacy.53  MLB claimed a violation of its
publicity, not privacy, rights.54
Interestingly, the court mentioned, but did not apply to the
facts, the notion that publicity rights provide the right holder
with incentives to continue productive activity.55  Perhaps the
court did not address this interest because of its obvious inap-
plicability to MLB players and their statistics.  While players
are certainly motivated to some extent by statistics because
their on-field performances, as measured by statistics, increase
or decrease their future value and celebrity, the publication of
these statistics is widespread and routine.  Therefore, singling
out one publisher of such information while regular media cov-
erage continues unabated would also seem like “strange law.”56
In sum, the court’s reasoning was almost exclusively fo-
cused on why the players’ interests are hardly applicable here,
as opposed to why the need for First Amendment protection is
so large.57  The only positive reason the Eighth Circuit gave for
why CBC’s speech deserves such protection was America’s his-
torical affinity towards baseball.58  To be clear, the court sup-
ported this claim about baseball and American society with
authority.59  Specifically, the court cited Cardtoons, L.C. v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Ass’n,60 a Tenth Circuit case involv-
ing the MLBPA and a right of publicity claim.61  There, the
plaintiff, a producer of baseball cards parodying MLB players,
obtained a declaratory judgment against the MLBPA stating
52. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 824.
53. Id.
54. Id.  See also supra Part III (contrasting publicity and privacy rights).
55. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 824.
56. Id. at 823.
57. Id. at 824.
58. Id. at 823.
59. Id.
60. 60.  95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
61. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
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that it did not infringe on the players’ publicity rights.62  Af-
firming the district court’s judgment for the plaintiff, the Tenth
Circuit referred to baseball as “the national pastime” and noted
the importance of promoting commentary, even of the “irrever-
ent” variety, about the game.63  However, Cardtoons focused
most of its First Amendment-societal reasoning on the merits
and importance of protecting the expressive form of “parody.”64
For instance, the court characterized the plaintiff’s speech—its
parody baseball cards—as an “important form of entertainment
and social commentary that deserve First Amendment
protection.”65
V. Individual-Societal First Amendment Reasoning in
Other Contexts
The C.B.C. Distribution court’s reasoning, adopted from
Zacchini, is not confined to situations involving state publicity
rights.  In fact, a wide variety of First Amendment cases contain
comparisons of individual rights to the larger set of societal con-
cerns espoused by the First Amendment.  For example, in Time,
Inc., v. Hill,66 the Supreme Court set aside a judgment against
Life magazine that was secured under New York’s right of pri-
vacy statute.67  There, the plaintiff sued Life magazine for pub-
lishing a brief article, which identified the plaintiff by name.68
The article was about a Broadway play based on a novel that
was inspired by the real-life kidnapping of the plaintiff and his
family.69  The novel, unlike the plaintiff’s true experience, con-
tained parts where the kidnappers commit violent acts against
the plaintiff and his family—elements the play and the Life ar-
ticle conveyed as well.70 Life magazine argued that the article
62. Id. at 962.
63. Id. at 972.
64. Id. at 972-73.  The expressive form of parody has also received First
Amendment protection when pitted against the right of publicity in non-commer-
cial contexts. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1189
(9th Cir. 2001) (parody of actor Dustin Hoffman).
65. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
66. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
67. Id. at 398.
68. Id. at 377
69. Id.
70. Id. at 378.
11
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was “ ‘of legitimate news interest’” and “ ‘of value and concern to
the public . . . .’ ”71  The majority opinion, written by Justice
Brennan, read a requirement of knowing or reckless falsity
under the facts of the case into New York’s right of privacy
law.72
However, the majority in Time did not declare the statute
facially unconstitutional for lacking this requirement; instead it
left future constitutional issues to New York courts.73  While ac-
knowledging the statute’s broad application, even as an occa-
sional remedy against the press, the Supreme Court
approvingly cited the New York courts’ construction of the stat-
ute to “ ‘avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public in-
terest.’”74  To ensure the proper balance between protecting in-
dividual privacy rights and upholding public benefits like the
free dissemination of ideas, however, the Court added the re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove that the publisher knowingly
or recklessly published the falsehood.75
The seeds of the Supreme Court’s Time decision were
planted three years earlier in the notable case of New York
Times v. Sullivan.76  There, the plaintiff, an elected official in
the city of Montgomery, Alabama, successfully sued the New
York Times and other individual defendants for libel after a
partially inaccurate “editorial advertisement” was published by
the newspaper without undergoing fact-checking.77  The Ala-
bama libel law at issue characterized any published words
71. Id. at 379.
72. Id. at 388.
73. Id. at 397.
74. Id. at 382 (quoting Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45
(N.Y. 1966)).  Although Time involved New York’s right of privacy, its rationale
was quickly extended to New York’s right of publicity.  In a case involving the
biography of celebrity Howard Hughes, a New York court, closely echoing Time,
asserted that “[j]ust as a public figure’s ‘right of privacy’ must yield to the public
interest so too must the ‘right of publicity’ bow where such conflicts with the free
dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public inter-
est.”  Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
75. Time, 385 U.S. at 382.
76. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doc-
trine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1995) (calling Sullivan one of the “most impor-
tant decisions in the First Amendment canon”).
77. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256, 261.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
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aimed at an individual’s “reputation, profession, trade or busi-
ness . . . or tend[ing] to bring the individual into public con-
tempt” as “libelous per se,” thereby allowing a plaintiff’s action
to succeed without proof of pecuniary injury.78  In holding that
this Alabama law insufficiently protected First Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court reasoned “that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”79  To
maintain this First Amendment ideal, the Court laid down a
special rule applicable to public officials who pursue defamation
actions: to prevail, the public official must prove that the “state-
ment was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.”80  Though not an explicit “balancing test” like the
one applied by the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C. Distribution, crucial
to the Court’s holdings in Time and Sullivan was the notion
that individual rights must be balanced against the vital socie-
tal benefits promised by the First Amendment.  Additionally,
Time and Sullivan demonstrate that courts can alter state laws
aimed at protecting individual rights, making such laws less ef-
fective vehicles for individual redress.  These alterations protect
media outlets to a certain extent and, more importantly, better
ensure the free dissemination of ideas.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,81 the Supreme Court once
again returned to this balancing act in a case dealing with a
libel action against a magazine publisher.82  In Gertz, the plain-
tiff, an attorney representing the family of a boy shot by a police
officer, sued a magazine publisher for libel after it accused the
plaintiff of framing the police officer and labeled him a “Lenin-
ist” and “Communist-fronter”—claims the Court characterized
as seriously inaccurate.83  In its reasoning, the Court declared
that the media is not absolutely immune from “the prospect of
civil liability for [the publication of] injurious falsehood.”84
While acknowledging that such an absolute rule would cer-
tainly eliminate the notion of a “timorous press” self-censoring
78. Id. at 263.
79. Id. at 270.
80. Id. at 279-80.
81. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
82. Id. at 325.
83. Id. at 326.
84. Id. at 341.
13
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itself out of fear of civil liability, the majority highlighted the
“competing value served by the law of defamation.”85  This com-
peting value, as the majority suggested, is the “compensation of
individuals for harm inflicted on them by defamatory
falsehood.”86
The Gertz Court then linked this individual right to “ ‘our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty.’”87  The Court later characterized the First Amendment
balancing test as one “between the need for a vigorous and
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing
wrongful injury.”88  Attaching more weight to the individual in-
terest than the Time and Sullivan decisions (as one can see
from the language cited above), the majority refused to extend
the more onerous “actual malice” standard of proof to the plain-
tiff in this case.89  Furthermore, Gertz, decided only ten years
after Sullivan, revealed that the Supreme Court’s protection of
media outlets is not absolute.  Individual rights, created by
state laws, can still trump the First Amendment and its grand
societal concerns.90
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,91 the Supreme Court
again applied its individual-societal reasoning to the right of
privacy.92  Claiming an invasion of his right of privacy, the fa-
ther of a deceased rape victim sought damages against a broad-
casting company for disclosing the victim’s name after it
obtained the name from public records.93  While citing the right
of privacy’s “impressive credentials,” the Court declared that in
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
88. Id. at 342.
89. Id. at 352.  The Supreme Court has also refused to extend this same
heightened standard to plaintiffs bringing publicity rights claims. See Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 56 (1988); see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision,
110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) (explaining that the combination of Hustler and
Zacchini makes it clear that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to public-
ity rights). See also Lee, supra note 41, at 493-94.
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
91. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
92. Id. at 491, 494-95.
93. Id. at 471-72, 474.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR107.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-APR-09 8:29
2008] INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL INTERESTS 213
situations like the one in Cox Broadcasting, where the mere dis-
closure of information is at issue, the right’s conflict with the
First Amendment is most direct.94  The majority characterized
both sides of this conflict, the individual right of privacy and the
larger benefits of a free press, as “plainly rooted in the tradi-
tions and significant concerns of our society.”95  However, the
Court ultimately reasoned that “interests in privacy fade when
the information involved already appears on the public re-
cord.”96  The First Amendment interests in Cox Broadcasting
were especially weighty, the Court continued, because the pub-
lic has a right to know information about the operation of gov-
ernment in order to “vote intelligently” and “bring to bear the
benefits of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”97
As noted above, the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C Distribution
did not rely on such weighty public interests.  Instead, the
Eighth Circuit cited America’s infatuation with the game of
baseball and its records.98  The Cox Broadcasting Court, attach-
ing far more weight to the societal interests advanced by a free
press, ultimately held in favor of the First Amendment and re-
jected the right of privacy claim.99  However, unlike Hill, an-
other privacy rights case decided only eight years earlier, the
Cox Broadcasting Court devoted a larger portion of its analysis
to acknowledging the right of privacy’s credentials, such as the
importance of protecting the individual interests secured by the
right of privacy.100
Individual-societal balancing also appears in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence not involving restraints on media outlets.
In Rankin v. McPherson,101 the Supreme Court decided the case
94. Id. at 489.
95. Id. at 491.
96. Id. at 494-95.
97. Id. at 492.  Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, argued for a broad
construction of “public affairs” that would include “any matter of sufficient general
interest to prompt media coverage”—a construction that would likely include pro-
fessional baseball. See id. at 501 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).  Furthermore,
courts have generally “taken a very inclusive stance when deciding what informa-
tion should be considered newsworthy.”  Willis, supra note 28, at 185.
98. See supra Part IV.
99. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 497.
100. Id. at 496.
101. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
15
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of a clerical employee in a county government’s office who was
fired for a comment made after the assassination attempt on
President Ronald Reagan.102  There, the Court balanced the in-
dividual interest of the employer “ ‘in promoting the efficiency of
the public services’” and the employee’s interest in speaking
about matters of public concern.103  While this language con-
cerned the individual employee’s First Amendment rights, the
Court’s reasoning was far broader and applied to the public at
large.  The Court showed concern for all government employees
and the “vigilance” (by courts, of course) that is necessary to
“ensure that public employers do not use authority over employ-
ees to silence discourse . . . simply because superiors disagree
with the content of employees’ speech.”104  Therefore, while the
Court ostensibly balanced the employee’s First Amendment
right of expression against the employer’s interest, the larger
societal impact truly troubled the Rankin Court.  The majority
ultimately held that the employee’s First Amendment rights
outweighed the employer’s interest in firing her.105
In the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court used indi-
vidual-societal balancing to produce different results.  In Time,
Sullivan, and Gertz, the Court employed this approach to
change or maintain a particular element of claims that impli-
cate the First Amendment.  For example, in Time, the Court al-
tered the intent element of a right of privacy claim.  On the
other hand, in Cox Broadcasting and Rankin, the Court’s bal-
ancing was outcome-determinative.  In other words, without
changing (or maintaining) the elements of the claim, the out-
comes in these cases were dependent on the side to which the
Court attached more weight.  The Eighth Circuit employed this
latter approach in C.B.C. Distribution.106
VI. Rethinking C.B.C. Distribution
The weight the C.B.C. Distribution court attached to CBC’s
speech was solely based on the content of the actual speech—
102. Id. at 379.
103. Id. at 384 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 392.
106. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
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the fact that the speech contained player names and statistics
of the game of baseball.  CBC is not a member of the press, as
traditionally understood, in contrast to the defendants in Time,
Sullivan, Gertz, and Cox Broadcasting.  Nor is CBC a govern-
ment employee like the speaker in Rankin.  To be clear, con-
tent-based analysis is not unique under First Amendment case
law.  Like the analysis in Time and Cox Broadcasting, the news-
worthy nature of the speech also mattered.  However, while
baseball statistics as records of the game may be newsworthy in
a constitutional sense,107 in C.B.C. Distribution there was no
concern over a timid press silencing its reporting of ideas and
events, as Gertz and Sullivan envisioned, due to a heightened
prospect of civil liability.  The Sullivan Court, for example, ar-
gued that the “fear of punishment” for speech creates the haz-
ard of “discourag[ing] thought, hope and imagination” and
breeds repression.108
Additionally, in C.B.C. Distribution, there was no expres-
sive form that the court sought to protect, as opposed to the
Cardtoons, L.C. court’s defense of parody.  But, according to the
C.B.C Distribution court, MLB players’ names and statistics are
of such great public interest that they warrant constitutional
protection under the First Amendment.  The Eighth Circuit’s
reliance on this single premise as the only positive example of
First Amendment importance makes the C.B.C Distribution
court’s reasoning distinctive among First Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Perhaps this explains the greater length and detail
which the C.B.C Distribution court employed to discredit the in-
terests allegedly protected by the players’ publicity rights.  Fur-
thermore, the First Amendment conflict in C.B.C. Distribution
was not as evident as the conflicts in the aforementioned cases.
As the Cox Broadcasting Court asserted, conflict with the First
Amendment is most direct where the mere disclosure of infor-
107. One court explicitly made this comparison. See Gionfriddo v. Major
League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Ct. App. 2001) (“It is manifest that as
news occurs, or as a baseball season unfolds, the First Amendment will protect
mere recitations of the players’ accomplishments.”).  The fact that CBC is not a
well-established news media outlet would not preclude protection under this the-
ory because the “First Amendment does not limit its protection to speech in ‘recog-
nized media.’” Lee, supra note 41, at 490.
108. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-76 (1927)).
17
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mation is at issue (e.g., a rape victim’s name). C.B.C. Distribu-
tion and other publicity rights cases, however, do not concern
the mere disclosure and usage of the speech, but instead con-
cern who gets to disclose and use the speech.
However, despite these unique features of the court’s rea-
soning, there are other factors that distinguish this case from
typical right of publicity cases, and therefore support the court’s
ultimate holding against MLB.  First, like the court records in
Cox Broadcasting, professional baseball player information is
readily available to the public.  In fact, its distribution is wide-
spread.  One does not need to go to a court or other public build-
ing to obtain baseball statistics.  Instead, newspapers,
television programs, and a multitude of other forms of free me-
dia provide these statistics on a daily basis.  Therefore, MLB’s
selective attack against CBC made its case look like an attempt
to claim ownership of certain information solely to offer fantasy
baseball games exclusively on its own terms.
Allowing media outlets to use the information for free while
foreclosing CBC’s right to use the same information would be,
as the court put it, “strange law.”109  Furthermore, the argu-
ment that such a position is valid because CBC used the infor-
mation to make money (by charging a fee to fantasy
participants) is constitutionally meritless110 and logically incon-
sistent.  Media outlets use the same information in their cover-
age of baseball to draw readers, viewers, and listeners.
Expansions of these constituencies increase profits as well.  Sec-
ond, CBC did not use the information to advertise any of its
products.111  Most successful publicity rights cases brought by
celebrities or athletes involve the unauthorized use of their like-
ness in an advertisement.112  In such cases, speech is “rarely pro-
109. C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823.
110. See id. (holding that regardless of whether speech informs or entertains
the reader, First Amendment protection is due). See also New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that a media outlet’s profitable use of
speech, by displaying an advertisement in exchange for money, does not affect the
caliber of First Amendment protection given).
111. Furthermore, the Gionfriddo court, reviewing MLB players’ publicity
rights in a separate case, suggested that the use of the information MLB sought to
protect in an advertisement would not necessarily be dispositive. See Gion-
friddo,114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316-17.
112. Id. at 317 (citing Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th
Cir. 1996) (basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar); White v. Samsung Elecs.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/7
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR107.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-APR-09 8:29
2008] INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL INTERESTS 217
tected” by the First Amendment.113  Here, while the use of
player names and statistics was vital to CBC’s operation, that
information was not used to draw new costumers.  If anything,
CBC’s use of player names and statistics promoted MLB itself
by garnering interest in the players and their daily perform-
ances.  This fact made the case for First Amendment protection
of CBC’s speech stronger.114  Third, CBC did not attach the in-
formation to merchandise which it intended for sale—a fact
that also bolstered the case for First Amendment protection.115
In the right of publicity context, most courts refuse to extend
First Amendment protection to merchandise, because courts do
not view merchandise as a “meaningful expression of ideas.”116
These three factors weakened MLB’s right of publicity claim
and therefore supported the Eighth Circuit’s holding against
MLB.
The adverse result for MLB in C.B.C. Distribution was also
inconsistent with the favorable treatment MLB has received
from courts in another area of law.  The Supreme Court has
given “favored treatment of [the] national pastime” in its inter-
pretation of federal antitrust laws.117  The Court first exempted
MLB from antitrust regulation in Federal Baseball Club of Bal-
timore v. National League.118  There, Justice Holmes, writing for
the majority, let MLB off the antitrust hook by curiously rea-
soning that, although MLB teams travel across state lines to
play against other teams, the interstate commerce requirement
of the Sherman Antitrust Act was nonetheless unsatisfied.119
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this exemption in Toolson v.
New York Yankees,120 reasoning, in a short and unsigned opin-
ion, that Congress had no intention of including MLB in the
America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (Vanna White of “Wheel of Fortune”);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (singer Bette Midler)).
113. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003).
114. See Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
115. See id.
116. Lee, supra note 41, at 488-89.
117. Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (In)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV.
319, 340 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s confusing approach in construing
antitrust laws).
118. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
119. Id. at 208-09.
120. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
19
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR107.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-APR-09 8:29
218 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:199
Sherman Antitrust Act.121  In the most recent Supreme Court
case reaffirming this exemption, the Court described the rich
history of the game, listed dozens of legendary players, and
even quoted a poem about the game in full.122  However, engag-
ing in self-critique, the Court also labeled the exemption an
“anomaly,” referred to its supporting precedent as an “aberra-
tion,” and acknowledged criticisms of the underlying reason-
ing.123  Lastly, while reaffirming the exemption yet again, the
Supreme Court stated that “the aberration is an established one
. . . .”124
While it is clear that the Supreme Court has bent over
backwards for MLB in the antitrust realm, the C.B.C. Distribu-
tion court was not so deferent to MLB.  Ironically, the court
used the game’s national pastime status and America’s affinity
towards the game not as reasons to support MLB’s position, as
the Supreme Court did in crafting the antitrust exemption, but
as reasons for finding against MLB.125  What makes this dis-
crepancy even more interesting is that MLB was essentially try-
ing to accomplish the same goals in the antitrust cases and
C.B.C. Distribution.  In the former cases, MLB’s attempts to un-
fairly eliminate competition were at issue.  In the latter case,
MLB unsuccessfully attempted to shutdown competitors to
MLBAM in an effort to corner the fantasy baseball market.
However, this apparent contradiction is logically consistent in a
certain way.  In the antitrust cases, if the Supreme Court found
against MLB, the introduction of entirely new, competing base-
ball leagues would have been facilitated.  This would have al-
tered America’s relationship with the game, as the nation then
knew it, and likely harmed MLB’s future livelihood.  In C.B.C.
Distribution, a decision for MLB would have altered the way
millions of fans connect with the game today—through fantasy
baseball.
121. Id. at 357.
122. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 261-64 (1972).
123. Id. at 282.
124. Id.  Other courts have been critical of MLB’s antitrust exemption as well.
See, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003)
(arguing that the “judge-made rule [is] premised upon dubious rationales”).
125. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2007).
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In both cases, the results seem to have protected American
baseball fans’ status quo relationship with the game of baseball.
Therefore, characterizing C.B.C. Distribution “as just another
example of baseball’s legal exceptionalism,”126 is not entirely
fair.  To be clear, in order to maintain the way in which fans
interact with the game, both the antitrust cases and C.B.C. Dis-
tribution may have employed strained reasoning at times.
However, unlike the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit de-
prived MLB of vast future revenues in its effort to accommodate
the fans.
VII. The Availability of Alternate Theories for MLB
Looking to the remaining forms of privacy rights (minus
the one from which the right of publicity derived), MLB could
have put forth three potential tort theories.  As previously
noted, courts have been generally reluctant to grant celebrities
like baseball players relief for invasions of privacy rights.127
However, it is still instructive to apply each tort theory to the
facts of C.B.C. Distribution in order to further illustrate the dif-
ferences between the two rights.  Despite the differences, how-
ever, the reasoning that defeated MLB’s publicity rights in
C.B.C. Distribution similarly defeats any privacy rights claim
MLB could have put forth in the case.  Under the right of pri-
vacy, the first theory provides that “[o]ne who intentionally in-
trudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”128
This theory is clearly inapplicable to MLB players and the
speech at issue in C.B.C Distribution.  Statistics represent a re-
cord of activities that professional baseball players willingly
perform in public.  Similarly, these players willingly place their
126. Eighth Circuit Holds that the First Amendment Protects Online Fantasy
Baseball Providers’ Use of Baseball Statistics in the Public Domain. C.B.C. Distri-
bution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th
Cir. 2007), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, Nos. 06-3357 & 06-3358 (8th Cir. Nov.
26, 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2008).
127. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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names in the public and use that publicity for their advantage,
such as to obtain endorsement deals.
The second theory provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
the private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern
to the public.129
This theory is inapplicable for the same reasons as the first
theory—essentially because records of what MLB players do
during games are not facets of their private lives.  Furthermore,
as noted above, courts have put forth arguments that baseball
is a legitimate public concern.130
The third theory provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the
other was placed would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or ac-
ted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.131
This theory was already dismissed—albeit to prove a differ-
ent point—by the C.B.C. Distribution court.  The court asserted
that there is no possibility that fantasy baseball participants
will be misled “because the fantasy baseball games depend on
the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a false im-
pression . . . .”132  The whole point of fantasy baseball is to accu-
rately attach points to each player based on their real-life
accomplishments.  Fantasy sports providers like CBC, there-
fore, have no incentive to distort statistics or otherwise place
MLB players in a false light before the public.  In fact, Yahoo!
129. Id. § 652D (1977).
130. See supra notes 93 and 107.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
132. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
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Sports has a robust policy—including mechanisms for reporting
statistical errors—to ensure the accuracy of all statistics.133
VIII. Conclusion
In light of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence,134 the fact that CBC’s speech embodied the history of
baseball does not appear to be of sufficient First Amendment
importance to override the individual harm caused by the
speech.  Based on their content alone, baseball statistics, re-
gardless of the degree of America’s love for the game, simply do
not match the grave concerns about press freedom, public de-
bate, informed voting, and governance the Supreme Court dis-
cussed in Time, Sullivan, and Cox Broadcasting.  However, the
right of publicity, when depicted in purely economic terms, is
simply inapplicable because MLB players’ economic interests
are not affected by CBC’s use of the information.  The informa-
tion is readily available to the public through other sources be-
sides CBC, and CBC did not use the information as a means of
advertising or merchandising.  Therefore, it would indeed be
“strange law” to penalize CBC and other fantasy sports provid-
ers for using this information in the manner they do.  This com-
mon-sense approach, employed by the Eighth Circuit, saved
fantasy sports from the grips of professional sports leagues and
allowed millions of fans to keep enjoying baseball in the way
they currently do—through fantasy baseball.
133. Yahoo! Sports Fantasy Baseball Help, How Do I Settle Scoring Disputes?,
http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/baseball/scoring/basics/baseball-01.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2008).
134. See supra Part V.
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